This fake "SARA RM300" site steals your card details as you type
A message says RM300 SARA aid is in your MyKad. The link opens a fake portal that sends your card details to the scammer as you type, before you press "Pay Now".

A Facebook page offering washing machine repairs leads to a WhatsApp chat, a fake payment link and, when that fails, a "booking app" that is really Android malware. We pulled the app apart. Here is what it does and how to stay safe.
On 2 November, a PenipuMY user reported the WhatsApp number 011-3335 8685, which goes by the name "ProCuci Servis". They wrote that it was posing as a service business, sent them a phishing link and asked them to install an Android app. Our team verified the report, then followed the link to see what the app really was.
You can see the report here: penipu.my/report/view/9sp-3-Y3SnI5aQ25xpnurA

It is called "ProCuci Servis" and looks like a normal washing machine repair business: 1.6K followers, friendly Malay captions, and a big "WhatsApp Now" button.
The "shop" replies from 011-3335 8685 and sends an "invoice" link on bayar-terus[.]online asking for a RM15 "booking payment". The rest (RM64) is supposedly paid only after the job is done, with a "3 month warranty" thrown in to sound legitimate.
When the payment does not go through, they'll say their office has just been told the FPX system is down. They offer to do a "manual booking" and promise you can pay in full after the work is done. Then they call you. In the case reported to us, the call lasted five minutes.
You get a link to services-4u[.]online with a short code at the end. The site looks like a polished home services company covering Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Johor Bahru, with a "Get Job Now" button.
The button downloads an APK file, and you are told to install it from outside the Play Store. Once installed and opened, the app quietly unpacks its hidden code and runs it.


So there are two traps in one chat. First a fake payment page that tries to take your card or bank details. If that fails, a malware app that can take over the phone itself.
The payment link is on a site that is now offline. We could not see what it showed. But in September our URL scanner caught a page on a similarly named domain, bayartepat[.]online, using the same /order/ link format. It was a brand new site posing as a checkout page, and our scanner has its page design flagged as a scam template.
Why both? A stolen card alone is often not enough, because the bank sends an OTP to the victim's phone. Malware of this kind usually reads SMS and notifications, which would let the scammers capture that OTP and complete the charge themselves. We could not confirm this from the encrypted code, but it is the most likely reason the same chat pushes a payment page first and an app second.


Each victim link only works once. A used or wrong code is sent somewhere else, so the app is hard to get hold of after the fact.
We did not need to guess any codes. The scam server left one of its folders wide open to the public. Inside it was the operators' own link generator, plus a plain list of every link they had issued and where each one downloads from.

That list also shows the scale. On 2 November it held 136 issued links. By 4 November it held 188, and new links were still being created. Not every code is a victim (some are tests, and a few were created during our own analysis), but the steady growth shows the operators are actively sending it out.
The app is not stored on the scam website. It is uploaded to GitHub, a popular site for sharing code, and the scam site simply points to it. This makes the download look less suspicious and costs the operators nothing.


The GitHub account hosting it was created just five days before our analysis and has only this one project.

Every Android app is signed by its maker. This one is signed with an anonymous certificate: every name field just says "np", the location is Nanjing, China, and it is valid for 1,000 years, until the year 3020. A real business does not sign its app like this. It is a common sign of a malware building kit.


A booking app needs very little. This one asks to:
And this is only the outer shell. The hidden code inside asks for more once it runs. In malware like this, that is usually where requests for SMS access (to read your OTPs) and Accessibility access (to see and control your screen) appear.

The same GitHub project now holds a second app, Delivery4ucod.apk. Inside, it is the same malware engine. This time it is signed with a public Android test key that anyone can use, not the China certificate.
The lesson: the operators change names, files and signatures between versions. Do not trust that an app is safe just because its name is different from one you saw in a warning.
Settings, Apps, find "Service4U" or any app you do not recognise.
Start with online banking, then other important accounts.
Tell them your phone may be compromised.
If you entered any banking details or saw strange activity.
If money was lost.
For security teams and researchers. Links are defanged.